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SUNLIGHT AND SHADOWS: 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS ON PRIVACY, PUBLICITY, AND FREE 
EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
 
Erin Coyle 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
A gossip and news website, in 2012, posted a grainy video 
showing a well-known professional wrestler and actor having sex 
with a woman who was not his wife.1  The celebrity, known as Hulk 
Hogan, sued for invasion of privacy, violation of his right of 
publicity, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.2  A district court of appeals held that 
a temporary injunction preventing the website from publishing 
excerpts of the video and a written report on Hogan’s affair was “an 
unconstitutional prior restraint” on a matter of public concern.3  A 
jury, however, found that publishing the video invaded Hogan’s 
privacy.4  The jury awarded more than $100 million in damages.5  
Fear of such large damage awards may eventually deter others from 
addressing the private lives of celebrities like Hogan, who have 
sought the spotlight in some arenas, and who may turn around and 
 
Assistant professor in the Manship School of Mass Communication at Louisiana State 
University. The author thanks the Joe D. Smith/Hibernia Professorship in Media and Politics 
for supporting this research. The author also thanks Louis Day, Ruth Walden, and Ian 
McCusker for discussions and comments on earlier drafts. 
1 A.J. Daulerio, Even for a Minute, Watching Hulk Hogan Have Sex in a Canopy Bed is 
Not Safe For Work but Watch it Anyway (Oct. 4, 2012, 2:15 PM), 
http://gawker.com/5948770/even-for-a-minute-watching-hulk-hogan-have-sex-in-a-canopy-
bed-is-not-safe-for-work-but-watch-it-anyway; Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 8:12-cv-
02348-T-27TBM, 2012 WL 5509624 at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2012).   
2 Bollea, No. 8:12-cv-02348-T-27TBM, 2012 WL 5509624 at *2. 
3 Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  
4 Jury Verdict & Settlement, Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, JVR No. 1603280023 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct. Mar. 21, 2016).  
5 Id. 
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sue members of the press for shining a spotlight that is unwanted 
when celebrities enter other arenas.6  
Laws that protect invasions of privacy caused by disclosures 
of personal information inherently may conflict with the 
constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and press.7  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has refused to categorically answer “whether truthful 
publication may ever be punished consistent with the First 
Amendment.”8  Legal scholar Amy Gajda has written that deciding 
where to draw the line between privacy rights and press freedom “is a 
difficult task, but one that is absolutely necessary, both for the 
protection of privacy and for the protection of First Amendment 
freedoms.”9  Louis D. Brandeis is known as a Justice who provided 
an intellectual foundation for privacy law in the United States10 and 
 
6 See, e.g., Len Niehoff, Hulk Hogan v. Gawker: A Fight Between Privacy and Free 
Speech, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar.16, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/len-niehoff/hulk-
hogan-gawker-lawsuit_b_9477556.html. 
7 See, e.g., The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989) (acknowledging the 
“tension between the right which the First Amendment accords to a free press, on the one 
hand, and the protections which various statutes and common-law doctrines accord to 
personal privacy against the publication of truthful information, on the other . . . ”); ERIN. K. 
COYLE, THE PRESS & RIGHTS TO PRIVACY: FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS VS. INVASION OF 
PRIVACY CLAIMS 23 (2012) (stating “the press’s First Amendment rights occasionally 
conflict with privacy rights recognized by state common law and statutory torts that protect 
individuals’ privacy interests against invasions by individuals or private entities.”). 
8 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001). 
9 AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN 
A FREE PRESS 260 (2015). 
10 See, e.g., Elbridge L. Adams, The Right of Privacy, And Its Relation to the Law of Libel, 
39 AM. L. REV. 37, 37 (1905) (calling Warren and Brandeis’ article as “one of the most 
brilliant excursions in the field of theoretical jurisprudence . . . ”); Randall P. Bezanson, The 
Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1133, 1134 (1992) (stating that the article “presented the idea of privacy as it should be 
understood”); Ruth Gavison, Too Early for a Requiem: Warren and Brandeis were Right on 
Privacy vs. Free Speech, 43 S.C. L. REV. 437, 438 (1992) (writing that “the article is 
supposed to be the most influential law review article ever written, an essay that single-
handedly created a tort and an awareness of the need for legal remedies for invasions of 
privacy.  It is a classic, a pearl of common-law reasoning . . . ”); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 
48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 383-85 (1960); Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, 
and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (2010) (stating that two pieces written by 
Brandeis “are the foundation of American privacy law.”); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. 
Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L. J. 123, 125 
(2007) (stating that “Warren and Brandeis did not invent the right to privacy from a 
negligible body of precedent but instead charted a new path for American privacy law.”).  
Cf.  Jeffery A. Smith, Moral Guardians and the Origins of the Right to Privacy, 10 
JOURNALISM & COMM. MONOGRAPHS 63 (2008) (arguing that multiple thought leaders had 
called for privacy protection before the Harvard Law Review published the Warren and 
Brandeis article).  
2
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espoused the value of transparency.11  This article reviews Brandeis’ 
writings for guidance on how he would balance privacy rights and 
public interests to receive truthful information on matters of public 
significance in an ideal democratic state.  
Brandeis is known for his co-authored 1890 Harvard Law 
Review article that called for judges to create a branch of law that 
presently provides individuals with means to sue for public exposure 
of sensitive information about an individual.12  Yet, Brandeis is also 
known for working with muckraking journalists to expose corporate 
and political corruption, which was not in the best interest of our 
democratic society.13  Brandeis wrote articles,14 letters,15 and court 
opinions that presented freedom of expression and publicity as 
powerful means to protect individuals against corruption and to 
promote their participation in self-governance.16  His writings 
introduced the concept, stating the need for judges to determine 
whether invasions of privacy were reasonable.17  This concept has 
allowed judges to balance privacy against other interests when 
 
11 See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, Is Transparency the Best Disinfectant?, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 389, 
389 (2010); Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow “War”: FOIA, the Abuses of 
Anti-Terrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1143-
44 (2007) [hereinafter Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight]; Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and 
Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, U. 
PENN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1991) [hereinafter Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters]; 
Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate 
Governance at the End of History, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 109, 113-14 (2004). 
12 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890) [hereinafter Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy].  See also Prosser, supra note 
10, at 383-85 (stating that the “noted” article “has come to be regarded as the outstanding 
example of the influence of legal periodicals upon the American Law.”). 
13 Erin K. Coyle, The Moral Duty of Publicity: Louis Dembitz Brandeis’ Crusades for 
Reform in the Press and Public Affairs, 1890-1916, 35 JOURNALISM HISTORY 162, 163 
(2009) [hereinafter Coyle, Duty of Publicity]. 
14 See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12; LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, 
OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914) [hereinafter OTHER PEOPLE’S 
MONEY]. 
15 See, e.g., Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Nov. 29, 1890), in 1 
LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, 94-95 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1971) 
[hereinafter 1 LETTERS]; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 22, 1890), 
in 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 96; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Feb. 
26, 1891), in 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 100. 
16 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
17 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 197; Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 473-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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determining whether invasions are unreasonable.18  This article 
explores how the writings of Brandeis on privacy, publicity, and 
participation in self-governance indicated the potential for individuals 
to fully develop in a democratic society and thus influence the 
balance of privacy interests. 
Brandeis believed that an ideal democratic state must allow 
individuals to reach their full human potential and assume civic 
responsibilities.19  To reach that potential, people needed education, 
opportunities to receive and discuss information relevant to potential 
government policies, and freedom to participate in determining what 
ideas could become laws or policies.20  Following a philosophy 
common among progressives, Brandeis opposed bigness in 
corporations and government.21  He favored competition among 
corporate and government actors because he believed such 
competition was more likely to help common individuals who were 
not engaged in economic or political corruption.22  As an attorney, 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice, and an advocate for reform, Brandeis’ 
focus on promoting self-fulfillment and self-governance in an ideal 
democracy is apparent in his writings about seemingly incongruent 
topics: protecting privacy against prying journalists and government 
agents,23 protecting individuals from corporate and political 
corruption,24 and protecting freedom to speak and participate in self-
government in a democratic society.25  This article aims to address 
the question of how to balance individual privacy interests against 
societal interests promoted by transparent government or corporate 
activities by reviewing Brandeis’ correspondence, speeches, 
 
18 See Slocum v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 542 So. 2d 777, 779 (La. Ct. App. 1989) 
(explaining an example of a judge weighing privacy against other interests when determining 
if it was an unreasonable invasion.). 
19 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 39 
(Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994).  
20 Id. at 39-40. 
21 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION 21-22, 70 
(1981) [hereinafter UROFSKY, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION]. 
22 Id. at 70. 
23 See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12; see Olmstead, 27 
U.S. at 473-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
24 See UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION , supra note 21, at 
21-22, 70. 
25 See Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most Cited Law Review Articles of All 
Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
4
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published articles, and Supreme Court rulings that address privacy,26 
the duty of publicity,27 political participation in a democracy,28 and 
freedom of expression.29  
II.  RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
Brandeis is known for writing about privacy in a landmark 
Harvard Law Review article,30 several letters,31 and a U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling.32  Brandeis co-wrote “The Right to Privacy” in 1890 
with Samuel Warren, Brandeis’ Harvard Law School classmate, 
friend, and former law partner.33  Roscoe Pound indicated that 
Brandeis and Warren added a chapter to the law as a result of that 
article.34  More recently, commentators recognized “The Right to 
Privacy” as one of the most cited law review articles of all time.35  
The 1890 essay called upon judges to recognize a legal right to 
privacy via common law tort that would protect individuals against 
prying by members of the press, photographers, and gossips.36  The 
essay called for courts to recognize a legal right to privacy that would 
protect “what Judge Cooley calls the right to be ‘let alone’ ” via 
common law precedent that could provide redress for psychological 
harms that resulted from unconsented disclosures of images and 
information related to individuals’ private lives.37 
 
26 See Warren & Brandeis, Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 206; See Olmstead, 27 U.S. 
at 473-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
27 See Coyle, Duty of Publicity, supra note 13, at 162. 
28 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
29 Id. 
30 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12.  
31 See, e.g., Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Nov. 29, 1890), in 1 
LETTERS, supra note 15, at 94-95; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 
28, 1890), in 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 97; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Samuel D. 
Warren (April 8, 1905), in 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 303. 
32 See Olmstead, 27 U.S. at 473-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
33 Brandeis and Warren practiced together from 1879 to 1889 and when Warren’s father 
died in 1889, Warren left the partnership to manage his family’s business.  Dorothy J. 
Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1979). 
34 ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 70, 650 (1956) (quoting a 1916 
letter from Roscoe Pound to William Chilton) [hereinafter, MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE]. 
35 Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 
110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012) (stating in 2012 that the Warren and Brandeis article 
was the second most-cited law review article of all time). 
36 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12 at 195-97. 
37 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 195-96, 198, 213. 
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Brandeis and Warren published the essay during an era of 
considerable change in the American population, technology, press, 
culture, and social mobility.38  After the Civil War, urban areas grew 
rapidly as people migrated from other countries and smaller towns.39  
Advances in photography made it possible for images to be snapped 
and sold without consent.40  Jacob Riis used flashlight to photograph 
members of a growing working class who lived in crowded houses in 
large cities.41  Telephone and telegraph lines also spread across urban 
centers, allowing individuals and employees of the Penny Press to 
quickly send news and information over distances.42  Details from 
personal events, thus, spread via images, word-of-mouth, and news 
stories.43  The Penny Press’ highly-circulated, inexpensive 
newspapers produced detailed stories that addressed society events, 
sports, crime, and matters of human interest to appeal to members of 
the growing working and middle urban classes, spreading details that 
elite classes did not want shared outside select social circles.44  
Warren and Brandeis quoted E.L. Godkin’s criticism of the 
inexpensive newspapers to support their call for privacy laws.45  
Historians have described Godkin—who was an attorney, journalist, 
and editor of The Nation—as an opinion leader and a distinguished 
 
38 See, e.g., JOHN F. KASSON, RUDENESS & CIVILITY: MANNERS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
URBAN AMERICA 71-79 (1990); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3 (expanded ed. 2003). 
39 See, e.g., KASSON, supra note 38, at 72; DON R. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE 
LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6-8 (1972). 
40 See, e.g., Robert E. Mensel, “Kodakers Lying in Wait”: Amateur Photography and the 
Right of Privacy in New York, 1885-1915, 43 AM. Q. 24, 27-28 (1991). 
41 See, e.g., JACOB A. RIIS, HOW THE OTHER HALF LIVES: STUDIES AMONG THE TENEMENTS 
OF NEW YORK 9-18 (Luc Sante ed., Penguin Books 1997) (1890). 
42 Joel A. Tarr & Thomas Finholt, The City and the Telegraph: Urban 
Telecommunications in the Pre-Telephone Era, 14 J. OF URB. HIST. 38 (1987); MICHAEL 
SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 34-35 
(1978). 
43 See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 195-96; 1870s-
1940s – Telephone, IMAGINING THE INTERNET, http://www.elon.edu/e-
web/predictions/150/1870.xhtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2016). 
44 See, e.g., ANDIE TUCHER, FROTH AND SCUM: TRUTH, BEAUTY, GOODNESS, AND THE AX 
MURDER IN AMERICA’S FIRST MASS MEDIUM 2-3 (1994); TED CURTIS SMYTHE, THE GILDED 
AGE PRESS, 1865-1900, 149 (2003); MARION TUTTLE MARZOLF, CIVILIZING VOICES: 
AMERICAN PRESS CRITICISM, 1880-1950 7-8 (1991). 
45 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 217 n.4 (citing E. L. 
Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen, SCRIBNER’S MAGAZINE, July 1890, at 58, 66 [hereinafter 
Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen]). 
6
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journalist.46  In a series of columns published prior to Warren and 
Brandeis’ article, Godkin criticized inexpensive newspapers and 
gossips for harming the dignity of persons and societal standards for 
morality by spreading details about personal lives.47  Godkin blamed 
newspapers for causing greater harm than gossips because the 
widespread publication of sensitive information “inflict[ed] what 
[wa]s, to many men, the great pain of believing that everybody he 
meets in the street is perfectly familiar with some folly, or 
misfortune, or indiscretion, or weakness . . . . ”48  Godkin argued that 
Americans needed some instrument, such as a law, to chill the wide 
circulation of such personal information.49  Warren and Brandeis 
acknowledged that call for a remedy to protect individuals from “the 
evil of the invasion of privacy by the newspapers.”50   
Newspapers addressed those who attended high-society 
weddings and parties in cities, such as Boston.51  Scholarship has 
suggested that Warren and Brandeis were inspired to write their 
essay, partly by newspaper coverage of the Warren family’s personal 
lives and events.52  Since Warren married Mabel Bayard, who was 
the daughter of a U.S. Senator and former candidate for President, 
newspapers published details about his wedding and his family’s 
 
46 See, e.g., FRANK LUTHER MOTT, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MAGAZINES: 1865-1885 22 
(1967); EDWIN LAWRENCE GODKIN, PROBLEMS OF MODERN DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC ESSAYS vi-xii (Morton Keller ed., Belknap Press 1966) (1896); Erin K. Coyle, E. 
L. Godkin’s Criticism of the Penny Press: Antecedents to a Legal Right to Privacy, 31 AM. 
JOURNALISM 262, 262-67 (2014) [hereinafter Coyle, E.L. Godkin’s Criticism of the Penny 
Press]. 
47 Coyle, E.L. Godkin’s Criticism of the Penny Press, supra note 46, at 262-72; Godkin, 
The Rights of the Citizen, supra note 45, at 66; E. L. Godkin, Cheap Newspapers, THE 
NATION, May 1, 1890, at 346; E. L. Godkin, Libel and Its Legal Remedy, AM. SOC. SCI. 
ASS’N, Dec. 1880, at 79-83; E. L. Godkin, The Law of Libel, THE NATION, Feb. 28, 1889, at 
173. 
48 Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen, supra note 45, at 66. 
49 Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen, supra note 45, at 67. 
50 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 195. 
51 PEMBER, supra note 39, at 23-24 (stating that “[t]he Warren-Brandeis proposal was 
essentially a rich man’s plea to the press to stop its gossiping and snooping . . . . ”). 
52 See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 10, at 383 (explaining that Warren married the daughter of 
Senator Bayard of Delaware, and she was among Boston’s social elite).  He wrote that 
Boston newspapers “covered her parties in highly personal and embarrassing detail” during 
the era of yellow journalism, “when the press had begun to resort to excesses in the way of 
prying . . . . ”  Prosser, supra note 10, at 383. 
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subsequent social affairs.53  In The Right to Privacy, Warren and 
Brandeis wrote: 
The press is overstepping in every direction the 
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.  Gossip 
is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, 
but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry 
as well as effrontery.  To satisfy a prurient taste the 
details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the 
columns of the daily papers.  To occupy the indolent, 
column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which 
can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic 
circle.  The intensity and complexity of life, attendant 
upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary 
some retreat from the world, and man, under the 
refining influence of culture, has become more 
sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have 
become more essential to the individual; but modern 
enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon 
his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, 
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily 
injury.54 
In a letter to Warren, Brandeis indicated that they wrote the article at 
Warren’s suggestion and because of Warren’s “deepseated 
abhorrence of the invasions of social privacy . . . . ”55  
Warren and Brandeis described a right to privacy deserving of 
legal protection as a right related to one’s control over whether and 
how his thoughts and sentiments are publicized.56  They argued that 
protection afforded to individuals to determine whether their ideas, 
thoughts, or words were publicized related to a right to be let alone.57  
The principle protecting personal writings was “that of an inviolate 
personality.”58  Warren and Brandeis added: 
 
53 See, e.g., Amy Gajda, What if Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t Married a Senator’s 
Daughter?: Uncovering the Press Coverage that Led to “The Right to Privacy,” 2008 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 35 (2008). 
54 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196. 
55 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Samuel D. Warren (April 8, 1905), in 1 LETTERS, 
supra note 15, at 303. 
56 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 198. 
57 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 204-05. 
58 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 205. 
8
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If we are correct in this conclusion, the existing law 
affords a principle which may be invoked to protect 
the privacy of the individual from invasion either by 
the too enterprising press, the photographer, or the 
possessor of any other modern device for recording or 
reproducing scenes or sounds. . . . If, then, the 
decisions indicate a general right to privacy for 
thoughts, emotions, and sensations, these should 
receive the same protection, whether expressed in 
writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in attitudes, or 
in facial expression.59 
Thus, a right to privacy could be recognized as part of a “more 
general right to the immunity of the person, —the right to one’s 
personality.”60  
The Right to Privacy suggested that individuals have a right to 
control whether and how their thoughts, ideas, and sentiments are 
conveyed to others, and that right of control was threatened by 
modern inventions, such as portable cameras and sound recordings, 
and by journalists or gossips who publicized details for individuals’ 
personal lives.61  Warren and Brandeis grounded the legal right to 
privacy in the right to an inviolate personality, which protected 
“individual demands.”62  They wrote: “The principle which protects 
personal writings and any other productions of the intellect or of the 
emotions, is the right to privacy, and the law has no new principle to 
formulate when it extends this protection to the personal appearance, 
sayings, acts, and to personal relation, domestic or otherwise.”63 
 In addition to recognizing that individuals endured emotional 
harm when gossip and news intruded upon the personal sphere, or 
domestic life, Warren and Brandeis argued that circulating those 
details harmed society.64  They wrote: 
Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, 
becomes the seed of more, and, in direct proportion to 
its circulation, results in a lowering of social standards 
 
59 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 206. 
60 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 207. 
61 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12. 
62 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 211. 
63 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 213. 
64 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196. 
9
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and of morality.  Even gossip apparently harmless, 
when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for 
evil.  It both belittles and perverts.  It belittles by 
inverting the relative importance of things, thus 
dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people.65 
The essay argued that those details detracted from individuals’ 
learning and thinking about “matters of real interest to the 
community,” thus the spread of gossip and sensational news had a 
“blighting influence” on society.66  The right to privacy, then, would 
afford legal remedies against severe emotional harms that deterred 
individuals from participating in an ideal democratic state and 
distracted others from focusing on matters of importance in an ideal 
democratic state.67  
Warren and Brandeis identified broad limitations for the right 
to privacy that allowed for judges to determine when invasions were 
unreasonable.68  First, a judge could not consider a publication of 
general interest or public interest an invasion of privacy.69  The essay 
distinguished between privacy interests for persons who have sought 
public attention, or notoriety, and those who have not.  Warren and 
Brandeis wrote:  
      In general, then, the matters of which the 
publication should be repressed may be described as 
those which concern the private life, habits, acts, and 
relations of an individual, and have no legitimate 
connection with his fitness for a public office which 
he seeks or for which he is suggested, or for any 
public or quasi public position which he seeks or for 
which he is suggested, and have no legitimate relation 
to or bearing upon any act done by him in a public or 
quasi public capacity.70  
 
65 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196. 
66 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196. 
67 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196. 
68 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 214-19. 
69 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 214-15 (“The design of the 
law must be to protect those persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate 
concern, from being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity and to protect all 
persons, whatsoever; their position or station, from having matters which they may properly 
prefer to keep private, made public against their will.”). 
70 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 216. 
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For instance, Warren and Brandeis wrote that “[p]eculiarities of 
manner and person” may be considered matters of public import 
regarding a candidate for public office.71  On the other hand, 
publicizing that a common person had a speech impediment would 
not be considered a matter of public importance.72  
Warren and Brandeis stated that the law of privacy would 
adopt privileges for communications recognized by defamation law, 
with the exception of the privilege for publishing truth.73  First, 
privacy law would not prohibit communication made in a court, 
legislative body, or other government body or quasi-public body.74  
Second, invasions of privacy would only apply to oral 
communications made with special damages, following restrictions 
applied for slander.75  As malice was not necessary to prove in most 
defamation claims, invasion of privacy would not require proving 
publicity was provided with ill will.76  Unlike the laws for libel and 
slander, however, privacy law would address harms caused by 
publishing either true or false information.77 
Since Warren and Brandeis’ recognition also drew upon 
rationales for copyright protection of personal writing,78 their 
recognition of limitations for privacy rights also related to limitations 
for intellectual property rights.79  They reasoned that the right to 
privacy was not invaded by an individual’s own publication of 
information or by publication with an individual’s consent.80  
Publicizing such information without consent would harm the 
principle of inviolate personality. 81  As such, compelling publication 
without permission would harm personal autonomy related to how to 
present one’s self to others, which would revoke solitude and privacy 
that would be “more essential” due to modern enterprises and 
“advancing civilization.”82  
 
71 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 215. 
72 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 215. 
73 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 216-18. 
74 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 216-17. 
75 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 217. 
76 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 218-19. 
77 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 218. 
78 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 198. 
79 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 218. 
80 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 218. 
81 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 205. 
82 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196.  
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Brandeis addressed the privacy article in two letters to Alice 
Goldmark, whom he was courting, in 1890.83  The first stated that he 
received the proofs, and what he read “did not strike [him] as being 
as good as [he] thought it was.”84  The second indicated that he and 
Warren hoped the essay would help shape public opinion regarding 
invasions of privacy.85  They wanted to convince people that such 
invasions are not necessary.86  They also wanted to “make [people] 
ashamed of the pleasure they take in subjecting themselves to such 
invasions.”87  Brandeis indicated that law would not be effective 
unless public opinion supported the premise for the law.88 
Several weeks later, Brandeis addressed privacy again in a 
letter to James Bettner Ludlow,89 a New York attorney involved in an 
unsuccessful invasion of privacy appeal the New York Court of 
Appeals considered in 1895.90  In that case, New York’s highest court 
did not recognize a right to privacy was violated during the use of a 
deceased woman’s image to sculpt a statue in 1895.91  A decade later, 
Brandeis informed Ludlow that Georgia’s highest court recognized a 
legal right to privacy in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance 
Co.92  The Pavesich court concluded that a man’s right to privacy was 
violated by an advertisement that used his image without his 
permission.93  Brandeis wrote, “You will, I know, be pleased, as I am, 
to find that the right to [p]rivacy is at last finding judicial 
 
83 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Nov. 29, 1890), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 94-95; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 22, 1980), in 1 
LETTERS, supra note 15, at 97. 
84 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Nov. 29, 1890), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 95. 
85 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 22, 1980), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 97. 
86 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 22, 1980), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 97. 
87 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 22, 1980), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 97. 
88 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 22, 1980), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 97. 
89 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to James Bettner Ludlow (April 20, 1905), in 1 LETTERS, 
supra note 15, at 306. 
90 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to James Bettner Ludlow (April 20, 1905), in 1 LETTERS, 
supra note 15, at 306; Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 22-23 (N.Y. 1895). 
91 Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 28-29 (N.Y. 1895). 
92 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
93 Id. at 73-74. 
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recognition.”94  Brandeis added that he received a letter from Judge 
Andrew Cobb, who wrote the majority opinion in Pavesich.95  That 
letter indicated the right to privacy “would before long become the 
established doctrine of our law.”96  
In 1905, Brandeis also wrote about The Right to Privacy again 
in a personal letter to Samuel D. Warren, in which Brandeis pointed 
Warren’s attention to an American Law Review article that cited The 
Right to Privacy.97  In the letter, Brandeis wrote to Warren stating 
that the citation of The Right to Privacy demonstrated that their 
article “remain[ed] a vital force.”98  Warren encouraged Brandeis to 
draft legislation to address invasions of privacy.99  However, 
Brandeis did not write a privacy statute.100 
More than two decades passed before Brandeis publicly 
addressed privacy in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States,101 
which included some key phrases also included in The Right to 
Privacy.102  The majority opinion in Olmstead held that federal 
prohibition officers did not violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
rights of Olmstead and his associates when the officers recorded 
Olmstead’s telephone conversations.103  The men were accused of 
violating the National Prohibition Act by importing, possessing, 
 
94 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to James Bettner Ludlow (April 20, 1905), in 1 LETTERS, 
supra note 15, at 306. 
95 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to James Bettner Ludlow (April 20, 1905), in 1 LETTERS, 
supra note 15, at 306. 
96 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to James Bettner Ludlow (April 20, 1905), in 1 LETTERS, 
supra note 15, at 306. 
97 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Samuel D. Warren (Apr. 8, 1905), in 1 LETTERS, 
supra note 15, at 302. 
98 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Samuel D. Warren (Apr. 8, 1905), in 1 LETTERS, 
supra note 15, at 302. 
99 Letter from Samuel D. Warren to Louis D. Brandeis (Apr. 20, 1905), quoted in 1 
LETTERS, supra note 15, at 303; Richards, supra note 10, at 1310-11. 
100 Richards, supra note 10, at 1310-11. 
101 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
102 Id. at 473-78 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining that as society continues to make 
advances in discoveries and technologies, it is inevitable that the government will have more 
efficient means available to them to invade one’s privacy, making it necessary to protect 
against any invasions of “the sanctities of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” (quoting 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).  
103 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466-69 (holding that wire-tapping did not amount to a search 
and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that the common law rule 
which allowed for illegally obtained evidence to be admissible in court was applicable in this 
case). 
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transporting, and selling liquors.104  Brandeis countered that 
government agents violated the law in the state of Washington where 
they recorded telephone conversations without the knowledge or 
consent of Olmstead and his associates, thus their actions invaded the 
privacy of Olmstead and his associates.105  Brandeis wrote: 
“Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, 
by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain 
disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet,”106 as advances 
in technology and journalistic prying made it possible that personal 
information whispered in the closet in 1890 could be shared with 
broader audiences.107  Brandeis’ Olmstead dissent described the 
wiretapping performed by the government agents as an instrument of 
“tyranny and oppression.”108 
Scholarship has considered Brandeis’ Olmstead dissent 
significant because it provided a foundation for modern conceptions 
of Fourth Amendment law109 and the constitutional right to privacy110 
that legal scholar Neil Richards calls “intellectual privacy.”111  That 
opinion reiterated the value of emotions and sensations that may be 
harmed by unreasonable invasions of privacy.112  Brandeis wrote:  
 
104 Id. at 455. 
105 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 n.13 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing a lengthy list of state 
statutory compilations which have made it a criminal offense to intercept, disclose or divulge 
without consent, or willfully interfere with the transmissions of any message made through 
the telegram or telephone). 
106 Id. at 473. 
107 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 195.  
108 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
109 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 643, 645 
(2007); Richards, supra note 10, at 1296 (explaining how Brandeis was able to “introduce[] 
modern concepts of privacy into constitutional law,” which had a major influence on the 
Supreme Court’s decision to recognize a constitutional right to privacy and change its 
perspective on Fourth Amendment law).  
110 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,152 (1973) (holding that even though the Constitution does 
not explicitly grant the right to privacy, the Supreme Court has recognized this 
“fundamental” right through its historic application of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-
96 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“Although the Constitution does not speak in so many words 
of the right of privacy in marriage, I cannot believe that it offers these fundamental rights no 
protection.”); Richards, supra note 10, at 1296. 
111 Richards, supra note 10, at 1298; NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: 
RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 95 (2015) (describing intellectual privacy 
as “a zone of protection that guards our ability to make up our minds freely.”). 
112 Olmstead, 277 U.S.at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure 
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.  They 
recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, 
of his feelings, and of his intellect.  They knew that 
only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of 
life are to be found in material things.  They sought to 
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their 
emotions and their sensations.  They conferred, as 
against the government, the right to be let alone--the 
most comprehensive of rights, and the right most 
valued by civilized men.  To protect that right, every 
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the 
privacy of the individual, whatever the means 
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  And the use, as evidence in a criminal 
proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must 
be deemed a violation of the Fifth [Amendment].113  
Addressing the facts in Olmstead, Brandeis indicated that 
wiretapping was a particularly invasive action because it recorded not 
only the conversations of someone suspected of committing a crime, 
but also recorded the conversations the suspected person had with 
other people.114  That act encroached upon the liberty of individuals 
not suspected of criminal activity.115  Brandeis recognized a 
constitutional right to privacy that would protect individuals’ 
information from such unwarranted collection of personal 
information by government actors.116 
Brandeis’ writings, accordingly, indicated that the 
Constitution and common law ought to protect individuals against 
unreasonable invasions of privacy that undermined his vision for a 
democratic state.117  Invasions were considered unreasonable when 
they harmed individuals’ sensations and emotions in a manner that 
exposed private persons to scrutiny otherwise reserved for voluntary 
participants in public life, such as political office holders.118  
Invasions were also considered unreasonable when government 
 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 475-76. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 478-79.   
117 Id.; Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 195-97.  
118 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 216. 
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agents acted in manners that could diminish individuals’ trust in the 
democratic system of laws.119 
III.  DUTY OF PUBLICITY  
Although publicity seemed to be a foe to privacy interests, 
Brandeis presented privacy and publicity as essential for an ideal 
democracy.  Through his work as the people’s attorney and a 
publicist, Brandeis also strove to protect individuals’ independence 
against powerful political or government actors.120  In those crusades, 
he used publicity as a means to protect individuals against 
exploitation that could potentially stunt their self-fulfillment,121 and 
as a means to enable individuals to contribute to democracy.122  
Commentators have noted Brandeis’ assertion that sunlight disinfects 
people’s actions,123 particularly when addressing his advocacy related 
to economic legislation and corporate activities.124  This section 
reviews some of Brandeis’ writings related to publicity as a means to 
promote good government and individual participation in democracy. 
Brandeis wrote about the duty of publicity in a letter 
indicating that he wished to write somewhat of a companion piece to 
The Right to Privacy called The Duty of Publicity.125  He proposed 
that sunlight could expose wrongdoing, preventing people from 
pretending to be honest or associating with honest people when they 
are actually encouraging “wickedness” in secrecy.126  He continued, 
“If the broad light of day could be let in upon men’s actions, it would 
 
119 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471-72, 484-85. 
120 See, e.g., ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE 32-39 (1936) 
[hereinafter MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE]; LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE 
OF BIGNESS (1935). 
121 See, e.g., MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 120, at 33-38.  
122 See, e.g., LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Robert W. Bruere, in 
THE CURSE OF BIGNESS, at 270-71 [hereinafter BRANDEIS, CURSE OF BIGNESS]. 
123 See, e.g., Coyle, Duty of Publicity, supra note 13, at 162; ETZIONI, supra note 11, at 
389; Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight, supra note 11, at 1144; Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and 
Scarlet Letters supra note 11, at 6-7; Winkler, supra note 11, at 113-14. 
124 See, e.g., Coyle, Duty of Publicity, supra note 13, at 162; Winkler, supra note 11, at 
113-14. 
125 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Feb. 26, 1891), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 100. 
126 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Feb. 26, 1891), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 100. 
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purify them as the sun disinfects.”127  Although he did not write that 
article,128 he subsequently addressed the duty for publicity to keep 
government and corporate corruption in check in letters, magazine 
articles, and speeches.129 
Throughout the late nineteenth century and into the first 
decade of the twentieth century, Brandeis used publicity to shine a 
proverbial spotlight on inefficiency, bribery, and corruption in the 
Boston government.130  In 1903, he helped form The Good 
Government Association, which focused on government in Boston.131  
A year later, he helped form the Public Franchise League, which 
focused more broadly on people’s interests in public utilities and the 
government in Massachusetts.132  Brandeis called upon citizens and 
business leaders to push for more efficient and less corrupt 
government that would favor public interests rather than political 
interests.133 
In a March 1903 speech delivered before the Boot and Shoe 
Club, Brandeis publicly criticized Boston officials for corruption.134  
He stated that public funds paid for work that was never 
completed.135  He also indicated that a member of the common 
council had resigned after he was charged with attempting to defraud 
the United States, and “there was an open vista of election frauds and 
corruption far surpassing anything ever known in this city” in 
1903.136  The Boston Herald summarized Brandeis’ argument, stating 
that publicity was “the foe of corrupt politics” and was the instrument 
 
127 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Feb. 26, 1891), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 100. 
128 MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE supra note 34, at 94. 
129 See, e.g., BRANDEIS, Address on Corruption, in CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 120, at 
263-65; MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 120, at 32-39; Louis D. 
Brandeis, Speech before the Good Government Association (Dec. 11, 1903) (transcript 
available in the Louis D. Brandeis School Of Law Library) [hereinafter Brandeis, Speech 
before Good Government Association]. 
130 BRANDEIS, Address on Corruption, in CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 120, at 263-65. 
131 MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE, supra note 34, at 118. 
132 MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE, supra note 34, at 118, 127, 129. 
133 BRANDEIS, Address on Corruption, in CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 120, at 263-65 
134 Rich Men to Blame, BOSTON HERALD, March 19, 1903, at 1. 
135 Id. (referring to a letter sent to Boston Newspapers, which indicated that Brandeis had 
not written down the speech made before the Boot & Shoe Club, and as such the newspaper 
incorrectly reports that he criticized work by clerks in the city’s financial departments); 
Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to the Editors of the Boston Newspapers (Mar. 24, 1903), in 1 
LETTERS, supra note 15, at 228-29. 
136 Rich Men to Blame, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 19, 1903, at 1. 
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that would inform citizens about municipal affairs.137  Brandeis urged 
members of the business community to take greater interest in the 
local government.138  A second published transcript of the speech 
indicated Brandeis stated that the opinions of the general public in 
Boston are sensitive, making their opinions capable of causing 
reforms when “intelligently directed” against corruption in any 
government department.139  He stated that Boston needed citizens to 
organize and seek competent government by revealing 
misgovernment: “The light of truth and honesty and honor will be 
shed in all the nooks and corners of our political system of Boston, 
and the corrupt politicians will be forced into darkness.”140  Brandeis 
proposed that providing citizens with information about 
misgovernment would empower citizens to call for reforms.141 
Less than a month later, Brandeis stated that misgovernment 
in Boston had reached the “danger point.”142  Brandeis praised then 
Mayor Patrick Andrew Collins for informing the public about a new 
investigation of how the city spent public money over the past 
decade.143  Brandeis stated, “At such a time, it behooves us to look 
about carefully and determine where danger lies, and where there is 
safety.”144  He offered Collins’ work to reveal financial records, 
which demonstrated an example of good government, showing that 
the records were of “of inestimable value.”145  Brandeis indicated that 
Collins’ report struck at the cause of past misgovernment by 
providing citizens with access to information about how public 




139 BRANDEIS, Address on Corruption, in CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 120, at 264. 
140 BRANDEIS, Address on Corruption, in CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 120, at 264. 
141 BRANDEIS, Address on Corruption, in CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 120, at 265. 




146 Id. The newspaper’s coverage of his speech and Collins’ report continued:  
The reason the people are indifferent is because they are ignorant of the 
facts—ignorant of the specific acts of misgovernment—ignorant of the 
low character or quality of many of the men by whom in public life they 
are misrepresented.  No one can grow enthusiastic over virtue in general 
or become indignant over evil in general.  It is the particular virtuous or 
vicious act in all its details which receives our admiration or excites our 
condemnation.  Not a man here who as a thinking and feeling human 
being can look into the details of our city’s administration and be 
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coverage of Brandeis’ speech explored the difference between 
governors who operated with secrecy and good governors who made 
information available to the public.147  The newspaper summarized 
Brandeis’ assertions that people should be able to learn information 
about government, stating that learning about misgovernment would 
inspire indignation and shame.148  Those feelings needed to be 
“followed by remedial action” to replace misgovernment with a 
government that served citizens’ interests.149  Citizens, however, had 
difficulties learning about how government officials conducted the 
city’s business because its Board of Alderman established a 
Committee on Public Improvement that met and voted in closed 
sessions, allowing the Alderman Committee to keep the 
government’s activities secret.150 
The week of the December 1903 elections, Brandeis made a 
more direct appeal for citizens to change who was representing them 
in Boston.151  Brandeis urged members of the Good Government 
Association not to support James Michael Curley, a local politician 
Brandeis said was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the government 
of the United States.152  In 1902, Thomas F. Curley and James 
Michael Curley pretended to be other men when they attempted to 
answer civil service examination questions.153  In a speech, Brandeis 
stated: 
      The waste and theft of public monies which result 
from having such men in office is bad enough, but a 
hundred times worse is the demoralization of our 
people which results . . . [s]hall we permit these, our 
fellow citizens—perhaps our future rulers—to be 
 
indifferent.  He will be at times filled with admiration by the excellent 
work done by some men—and at other times roused to indignation—
overcome by shame that the offices of a great people are prostituted by 
his own representatives to their contemptible and corrupt ends. 




150 MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE, supra note 34, at 121. 
151 Brandeis, Speech before Good Government Association, supra note 129.  
152 Brandeis, Speech before Good Government Association, supra note 129 (“Nothing 
breeds faster than corruption.  Every criminal in the public service is a plague spot spreading 
contagion on every hand.  Think what a heritage we shall leave to our children if corruption 
is allowed to stalk about unstayed [sic.].”  
153 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 227 n.4. 
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taught that in Boston liberty means license to loot the 
public treasury—that in Boston opportunity means the 
chance for graft.154   
Despite Brandeis calling upon “men of honor” to vote against Curley 
and other criminals, and thus protect Boston from future corruption, 
Curley won reelection.155  Four of the nine candidates that the Good 
Government Association endorsed were not elected in 1903.156  
Thereafter, Brandeis responded with plans for the association to 
systematically use more publicity for its candidates to win elections 
the following year.157 
Brandeis again addressed the importance of an informed 
citizenry when he spoke before the Public School Association in 
1904.158  He called upon citizens to cast their votes for “men and 
women who are scrupulously honest,” “absolutely disinterested,” and 
“efficient.”159  He contrasted those characteristics with those of 
Bostonians who sought public jobs for themselves and their friends 
“by corrupt means to obtain from public officers corrupt contracts to 
enrich themselves.”160  He chided people who were uninformed or 
who rationalized not voting on the premise that they would not 
support “machine politicians;” he identified their responsibility for 
the bad government that resulted from a lack of votes for candidates 
who would serve the public interest.161  Brandeis stated, “Democracy 
means that the people shall govern, and they can govern only by 
taking the trouble to inform themselves as to the facts necessary for a 
correct decision, and then by recording that decision through a public 
 
154 Brandeis, Speech before Good Government Association, supra note 129. 
155 Id.  Curley went on to serve as the mayor of Boston, governor of Massachusetts, and a 
U.S. congressman. James Michael Curley, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/James-Michael-Curley (last visited Sept. 17, 2016).  
156 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Edmund Billings (Dec. 16, 1903), in 1 LETTERS, 
supra note 15, at 240 n.2. 
157 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Edmund Billings (Dec. 16, 1903), in 1 LETTERS, 
supra note 15, at 238-40.  He suggested that Edmund Billings, secretary of the association, 
systematically start contacting more associations and arranging for speakers to address good 
government during at least one hundred meetings. Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Edmund 
Billings (Dec. 16, 1903), in 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 239. 
158 Louis D. Brandeis, Speech before the Public School Association (Dec. 2, 1904.) 
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vote.”162  In a democracy, then, publicity must provide citizens with 
information, and citizens must seek that information to educate 
themselves regarding the administration of government; otherwise, 
governors could act in secrecy against the public’s interest.163 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, muckrakers and members 
of the Progressive Movement used publicity to expose abuses to the 
general public in the hope that the public would call for 
accountability and reform.164  At that time, members of the 
Progressive Movement referred to publicity as a type of “broad 
searchlight for exposing [corporate] excess and [political] corruption 
. . . .”165  As a progressive, Brandeis corresponded with leading 
muckraking journalists, editors, and publishers during the twentieth 
century.166  Muckraking magazines published more than a dozen of 
Brandeis’ articles that addressed abuse of power during the 
Progressive era.167  Communication scholars, Kevin Stoker and Brad 
Rawlins, wrote that muckraking journalists and social activists saw 
publicity as a “ ‘righteous weapon for fighting social ills . . . .’ ”168  
Stoker and Rawlins described “the progressive[’s] definition of 
publicity as something with the intrinsic value of correcting corporate 
wrongdoing.”169  Brandeis also used the term in that manner.170 
As progressives used publicity in their pursuit of political 
freedom and economic independence, Brandeis used publicity as he 
sought to protect citizens’ interests against government employees’ 
misdirected loyalties that could enrich politicians and corporations at 
the expense of the public.171  For instance, Brandeis represented an 
Interior Department employee in a Congressional investigation 
examining reports made by the Taft administration, which stated that 
corporations gained access to coal filings and land in Alaska by 
 
162 Id. 
163 See MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE, supra note 34, at 121. 
164 Kevin Stoker& Brad Rawlins, The “Light” of Publicity in the Progressive Era: From 
Searchlight to Flashlight, 30 JOURNALISM HIST. 177, 177 (2005) 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273439997_The_Light_of_Publicity_in_the_Progr
essive_Era_From_Searchlight_to_Flashlight.  
165 Stoker & Rawlins, supra note 164, at 177. 
166 Coyle, Duty of Publicity, supra note 13, at 163. 
167 Coyle, Duty of Publicity, supra note 13, at 164. 
168 Stoker & Rawlins, supra note 164, at 178. 
169 Stoker & Rawlins, supra note 164, at 177. 
170 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 92. 
171 See, e.g., Brandeis, Speech before Good Government Association, supra note 129. 
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having an individual obtain the land on their behalf.172  Brandeis’ 
investigation revealed that Louis Glavis reported the conspiracy to 
then Secretary of the Interior, Richard A. Ballinger, who also 
previously worked as an attorney for some of the applicants for tracts 
of the land.173  Some of the lands were also under the jurisdiction of 
the Chief Forester, Gifford Pinchot, who reported the potential 
conspiracy to President William Howard Taft.174  Glavis also reported 
what had occurred to Taft, who sent Glavis’ report to Ballinger.175  
The Secretary of the Interior then sent Taft a report for Taft to sign.176  
The report, which Taft signed, praised Ballinger and directed 
Ballinger to dismiss Glavis.177  When another employee testified that 
Ballinger—not Taft—had written that report, the investigation 
revealed duplicity.178 
Following the Progressive tradition, Brandeis focused on 
informing citizens about official wrongdoing as he investigated the 
actions of Ballinger and Glavis.179  Brandeis called for Ballinger to be 
held accountable for wrongdoing, and he sent copies of his arguments 
defending Glavis to members of the press.180  Brandeis argued that 
Glavis should not be punished for insubordination in a society 
endangered by employees who are “of too complacent obedience to 
the will of superiors” and forget their obligation to serve the public.181  
 
172 MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 120, at 46.  
173 MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 120, at 46. 
174 MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 173, at 46-47. 
175 MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 120, at 46-47. 
176 MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 120, at 47. 
177 M MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 120, at 47. 
178 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION, supra note 21, at 57-61. 
179 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION, supra note 21, at 60. 
180 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION, supra note 21, at 59-60. 
181 Louis D. Brandeis, Opening Argument at the Joint Committee to Investigate the 
Interior Department and Forestry Service (May 27, 1910) (transcript available in the Louis 
D. Brandeis School Of Law Library) [hereinafter Brandeis, Opening Argument].  Brandeis 
suggested that Ballinger had misperceived what type of loyalty is desired in a democracy.  
Brandeis wrote: 
The loyalty that you want is loyalty to the real employer, to the people of 
the United States.  This idea that loyalty to an immediate superior is 
something commendable when it goes to a forgetfulness of one’s country 
involves a strange misconception of our Government and a strange 
misconception of what democracy is.  It is a revival—a relic of the Slave 
status, a relic of the time when “the king could do no wrong,” and when 
everybody owed allegiance to the king.  The people to whom our 
officials owe allegiance are the people of the United States, and every 
man in it who is paid by the people of the United States and who takes the 
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He stated that Americans needed public employees to think about 
their responsibility to citizens—not only to their superiors.182  He 
stated: “We are not dealing here with a question of the conservation 
of natural resources merely; it is the conservation and development of 
the individual; it is the conservation of democracy; it is the 
conservation of manhood. That is what this fight into which Glavis 
entered most unwillingly means.”183  Brandeis praised Glavis and a 
second employee for disclosing the acts of superiors.184  Glavis and a 
second employee exposed wrongdoing to sunlight rather than 
allowing such actions to be hidden in the shadows.185 
Brandeis also used publicity as a tool for reform when he 
sought to protect common people against the turmoil he believed 
would ultimately result from concentrated economic power.186  He 
encouraged economic competition because he recognized that 
concentrated economic power, as well as concentrated political 
power, could cause social turmoil that would hinder individuals’ 
freedom to enjoy life in an ideal democratic state.187  His article, 
What Publicity Can Do, stated: “Publicity is justly commended as a 
remedy for social and industrial diseases.  Sunlight is said to be the 
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.” 188   
Scholars subsequently have cited those opening lines from Brandeis’ 
 
oath of office owes that allegiance to the people of the United States and to 
none other.  These men who stand by the Secretary with a sort of 
personal fidelity and friendliness are actually disloyal.  They may claim 
that they are not insubordinate to him; but they are insubordinate to the 
people of the United States. 
Brandeis, Opening Argument, supra note 181.  
182 Brandeis, Opening Argument, supra note 181.  
183 Brandeis, Opening Argument, supra note 181.  
184 Brandeis, Opening Argument, supra note 181. 
185 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION, supra note 21, at 60.  Ballinger 
resigned in 1911. UROFSKY, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION, supra note 21, at 
61. 
186 MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE, supra note 34, at 104-05 (“Brandeis saw democracy 
fatally threatened by the ‘excesses’ of capitalism, by ‘its own acts of injustice.’ ”). 
187 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION, supra note 21, at 70 (stating 
that “Reason and morality imposed limits on the competitive struggle.  Brandeis also held 
that political democracy depended upon economic democracy;” MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE, 
supra note 34, at 104 (explaining that Brandeis believed that “social turmoil, as he saw it, 
was but the natural, inevitable byproduct of a changing order, of the shift of power from the 
few to the many.”). 
188 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 92. 
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article as support for transparency in business and government.189  
That article was part of a series of Brandeis’ articles, published in 
Harper’s Weekly in 1913 and 1914, that addressed the concentration 
of power of investment bankers and the consolidation of banks and 
railroads. 190  Those articles presented economic risks that Brandeis 
associated with concentrations of wealth and financial power and his 
proposals for legislative and economic reforms.191  What Publicity 
Can Do described publicity as a “potent force” and “in many ways as 
a continuous remedial measure.”192  By publishing articles on 
excesses and speaking about reforms at meetings, Brandeis used 
publicity as a means to make the public aware of entities that had 
grown powerful enough for select people to gain financial benefits 
without necessarily providing common people with benefits that 
Brandeis sought for all citizens.193 
Brandeis demonstrated that publicity could serve as a tool to 
promote reform.194  He stated that the law was starting to require 
publicity as a measure to protect the public’s interest in fair 
competition.195  He indicated that The Federal Pure Food Law helped 
citizens make decisions about food quality because the law required 
manufacturers to disclose ingredients, shining a metaphorical 
flashlight on food products.196  He suggested that the public needed to 
similarly require banks to inform investors about the values of 
securities and how much bankers earned by marketing and selling the 
securities.197  Brandeis identified the wealth of investment bankers as 
a problem that limited the potential for common people to gain “New 
Freedom.”198  He indicated that individual investors contributed to 
that wealth partly due to ignorance regarding the benefits bankers 
 
189 See, e.g., Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight, supra note 11, at 1144; Kreimer, Sunlight, 
Secrets, and Scarlet Letters, supra note 11, at 6-7; Winkler, supra note 11, at 113-14. 
190 See Norman Hapgood, Preface to BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, 
at xiv. 
191 Norman Hapgood, Preface to BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 
xiii. 
192 Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 92. 
193 BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14. 
194 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 92. 
195 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 98. 
196 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 103-
04. 
197 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 101-
03. 
198 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 97. 
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received when individuals invested in securities.199  He called for 
bankers to disclose to investors the commissions and profits the 
bankers received from selling stocks or bonds, as well as how the 
bankers’ financial benefits were influenced by the riskiness of 
securities for investors.200  He wrote, “To be effective, knowledge of 
the facts must be actually brought home to the investor, and this can 
best be done by requiring the facts to be stated in good, large type in 
every notice, circular, letter and advertisement inviting the investor to 
purchase.”201  Brandeis proposed that banks, railroads, public 
services, and industrial corporations should be subjects of publicity, 
so that their actions would be subjected to the force of public 
opinion.202 
Brandeis’ essay, True Americanism, connected his themes on 
the need for education and information regarding government and 
economics to the rights for individuals to enjoy liberty and freedom 
in a democracy.203  Brandeis stated that American ideals “are the 
development of the individual for his own and the common good—
the development of the individual through liberty and the attainment 
of the common good through democracy and social justice.”204  He 
added that the American “form of government, as well as our 
humanity, compels us to strive for the development of the individual 
man.”205  Brandeis related the ideal for individuals to exercise the 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution to “liberty, freedom in things 
industrial as well as political,” and “the full development and 
utilization of one’s faculties.”206  He wrote that democracy depended 
upon equal opportunities for all individuals to develop and advance 
 
199 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 99. 
200 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 101-
03. 
201 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 104. 
202 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 93, 
99, 103. 
203 Louis D. Brandeis, True Americanism, HARPER’S WEEKLY, July 10, 1915, at 31-32.  
THE CURSE OF BIGNESS identified this piece as a speech that Brandeis delivered at Faneuil 
Hall in Boston, on July 4, 1915. BRANDEIS, List of Addresses, in CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra 
note 120, at 271.  
204 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 31. 
205 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 31. 
206 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 31. (explaining that individuals needed 
education initially through formal schooling and later through discussions or reading, for 
“freshness of mind” it is necessary that work conditions allow individuals to enjoy freedom 
from oppressive industrial power during work hours and enjoy time off for leisure activities, 
and also have “some degree of financial independence.”).  
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civilization.207  Each person’s exercise of individual rights in the 
twentieth century democracy, thus, was limited when the exercise 
“interfere[d] with the exercise of a like right by all others.”208 
Thus, in a democracy, Brandeis identified a duty for the 
press.209  He hoped for people to use publicity to provide the public 
with information that would help individuals develop and advance 
the common good, particularly when publicity served as a tool for 
social justice by piercing the veils of secrecy that prevented the 
public from discovering practices that helped powerful entities and 
did not help the general public.210  Publicity also served as a valuable 
tool for exposing other people’s actions that would hinder an 
individual’s development or harm the common good.211  But 
exercising freedom of expression for publicity, as is true for the 
exercise of other rights, necessarily must be limited when the 
exercise would hinder individual liberty or the common good for 
society.212 
IV.  FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY 
Brandeis believed that laws needed to keep pace with 
contemporary standards in a democratic society.213  In 1916, he wrote 
that the American ideal of government had changed from “A 
government of laws and not of men” to a government that promotes 
“[d]emocracy and social justice.”214  An ideal democracy provided 
people with the freedom and opportunities to develop fully as 
 
207 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32.  
208 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32.  
209 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Edwin Munroe Bacon (Aug. 6, 1890), paraphrased 
in 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 90.  Urofsky and Levy paraphrased that letter as stating 
“Americans put up with many abuses less from indifference than from forgetfulness.  
Today’s wrong is forgotten quickly by people involved with their jobs and interests.  A 
reform-minded press must not only point out new evils, but remind people of old ills, so they 
will not be forgotten.” Id. 
210 Coyle, Duty of Publicity, supra note 13, at 163. 
211 Coyle, Duty of Publicity, supra note 13, at 163. 
212 See Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32 (“Each man may develop 
himself so far, but only so far, as his doing so will not interfere with the exercise of a like 
right by all others.  Thus liberty came to mean the right to enjoy life, to acquire property, to 
pursue happiness in such manner and to such extent only as the exercise of the right in each 
is consistent with the exercise of a like right by every other of our fellow citizens.  Liberty 
thus defined underlies twentieth century democracy.”). 
213 Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Feb. 19, 1916, at 173. 
214 Id. 
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individuals and help promote the well being of society.215  
Democracy also allowed for government to limit individual exercises 
of expression and other rights, when such exercises harmed another 
person’s liberty—the rights to enjoy life, acquire property, and 
pursue happiness.216  Brandeis’ concurring opinion in Whitney 
suggests that freedom of expression “is essential” to democracy and, 
thus, trivial harm to personal liberties cannot justify a restriction on 
freedom of expression.217  Neil Richards has suggested that Brandeis 
changed his mind about the exercise of freedom of expression in a 
democratic society after he joined the U.S. Supreme Court, and that 
shift might have affected how to logically balance privacy and free 
expression rights.218  Thus, this section reviews opinions, in which 
Brandeis addressed freedom of expression or privacy, to address how 
he perceived those interests during the twentieth century.    
The American federal government grew bigger during World 
War I, as Congress sought to protect the nation by passing 
legislation.219  Brandeis primarily voted with the rest of the U.S. 
Supreme Court to uphold that legislation.220  Congress passed several 
statutes that restricted free speech.221  Brandeis initially voted with 
the majority in support of the federal government’s application of two 
of those statutes in Schenck v. United States,222 Frohwerk v. United 
States,223 and Debs v. United States.224  Justice Holmes wrote all three 
 
215 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 31. 
216 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32. 
217 See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[E]ven imminent 
danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions essential to effective 
democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious.  Prohibition of free speech and 
assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a 
relatively trivial harm to society.”).   
218 Richards, supra note 10, at 1321-22. 
219 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 545-46 (2009) [hereinafter UROFSKY, 
A LIFE]. 
220 Id. at 546. 
221 Id. at 548-49.  The Selective Service Act allowed the federal government to punish 
people who dodged the draft. Id. at 548.  The Espionage Act of 1917 punished the making of 
false reports that benefited the enemy, harmed the United States by causing disobedience of 
soldiers, or obstructed recruitment or enlistment of soldiers. Id. at 548-49.  The 1918 
Sedition Act targeted activities that included “printing, writing, or publishing any disloyal 
. . . language.” UROFSKY, A LIFE, supra note 219, at 549.  The Immigration Act of 1918 also 
allowed the government to deport non-citizens “who believed in the use of force to 
overthrow the government.” Id. at 549.  
222 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
223 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
224 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
27
Coyle: Sunlight and Shadows
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
238 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
unanimous rulings that addressed uses of publicity.225  Schenck 
addressed whether the First Amendment was violated after two 
socialists were indicted under federal law.226  Charles Schenck and 
Elizabeth Baer were charged under the Espionage Act of 1917 for 
distributing a circular to cause and attempt to cause insubordination 
in the U.S. military services and to obstruct the U.S. armed forces’ 
recruitment and enlistment when the nation was at war.227  They were 
also charged with conspiring to mail and mailing the circulars, which 
were not mailable under the Espionage Act.228  The majority ruling 
affirmed the indictments.229  The majority’s rationale indicated that 
the First Amendment does not prevent punishment of words that are 
“used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive 
evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”230  A week later, the 
majority affirmed Frohwerk’s conviction for violating the Espionage 
Act by preparing and circulating newspaper articles that were 
evidence of “a conspiracy to obstruct” the U.S. armed forces’ 
recruitment.231  On the same day, the majority also confirmed Eugene 
Debs’ conviction for attempting to obstruct military recruitment by 
delivering speeches.232  In both cases, the defendants’ actions were 
treated as threats to the security of the nation during wartime—not 
expressions protected by the First Amendment.233  The war also 
affected the rulings of the Court at that time.  Professor Melvin 
Urofsky stated that the Court delayed cases that did not involve 
questions for “which the government needed a quick decision.”234  
 
225 Schenck, 249 U.S. 47; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. 204; Debs, 249 U.S. 211. 
226 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48-49. 
227 Id. at 48-49. 
228 Id. at 49. 
229 Id. at 49, 53. 
230 Id. at 52 (citations omitted) (stating “We admit that in many places and in ordinary 
times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their 
constitutional rights.  But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in 
which it is done.  The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in 
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.  It does not even protect a man from an 
injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.  The question in every 
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances are of such a nature as to 
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent.  It is a question of proximity and degree.”). 
231 Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 204-06, 209-10. 
232 Debs, 249 U.S. at 212, 216-17. 
233 Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 209; Debs, 249 U.S. at 212-13, 216. 
234 UROFSKY, A LIFE, supra note 219, at 545. 
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Brandeis also initially followed the Wilson administration’s wishes 
and did not dissent.235 
Brandeis and Holmes, however, strayed from the majority 
after their thoughts on free expression interests and Espionage 
changed after they read Zechariah Chafee’s 1919 article,236 Freedom 
of Speech in War Time.237  Chafee described the First Amendment as 
“a declaration of national policy in favor of the public discussion of 
all public questions.”238  Chafee criticized Holmes’ opinions in 
Schenck and Debs for missing an opportunity to clarify what forms of 
expression fall inside the protection of the First Amendment and 
which ones do not.239  Almost five months after that article was 
published in the Harvard Law Review, Brandeis supported Holmes’ 
dissenting opinion in another Espionage Act case involving 
publicity.240  The majority ruling in Abrams v. United States241 
confirmed the conviction of five Russian-born defendants involved in 
printing and distributing 5,000 circulars that called President Wilson 
a “hypocrite and a coward because troops were sent into Russia” 242 
and called upon workers to “Rise!” and “Put down your enemy.”243  
Holmes, however, reasoned that the language at issue might call upon 
workers to strike, but the language did not actually threaten to hinder 
the United States’ war efforts.244  The dissenting opinion suggested 
that the majority was applying the clear and present danger test too 
broadly in this case.245  Holmes wrote that this case was punishing 
opinions and freedom of speech should limit punishment of 
 
235 UROFSKY, A LIFE, supra note 219, at 545. 
236 Richards, supra note 10, at 1321-22. 
237 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919). 
238 Id. at 934. 
239 Id. at 943-44. 
240 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 616, 624, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
241 Id. at 616. 
242 Id. at 616-19, 624.  The indictment stated that the circulars included “ ‘disloyal, 
scurrilous and abusive language about the form of government of the United States;’ . . . 
language ‘intended to bring the form of government of the United States into contempt, 
scorn, contumely and disrepute;’ and . . . language ‘intended to incite, provoke and 
encourage resistance to the United States’ ”  in its war efforts. Id. at 617.  They also were 
charged with conspiring to “urge, incite and advocate curtailment of production of things and 
products, to wit, ordnance and ammunition, necessary and essential to the prosecution of the 
war.” Id. 
243 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 620. 
244 Id. at 626 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
245 Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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expression to “Only the emergency that makes it immediately 
dangerous” and the type of “evil” that Congress may correct.246 
In 1920, Brandeis wrote a dissenting opinion in another 
Espionage Act case involving publicity.247  Scholars suggest that 
Brandeis’ change of heart about the importance of freedom of speech 
was apparent in Schaefer v. United States,248 in light of Chafee’s 
article.249  Brandeis and Holmes agreed with the majority’s dismissal 
of the convictions of two people on the basis that the government had 
not proven those defendants were involved with publishing false 
statements and reports,250 but they dissented from the majority’s 
decision that upheld the convictions of an editor and business 
manager of German language newspapers under the Espionage 
Act.251  Citing Chafee’s article, Brandeis wrote that Chafee had 
shown that the clear and present danger must be limited to only 
immediate and actual threats of danger.252  Brandeis indicated that the 
newspaper articles at issue could not be considered such threats.253  
He also challenged the majority’s finding that the news reports 
willfully conveyed false reports intended to promote the success of 
the United States’ German enemies.254  Brandeis read the English 
translation and the original German articles to address the charge of 
willful falsity.255  He found the slight variation between the two 
works did not provide evidence that the publishers added to the 
original dispatch and thus created a false statement.256  Nor did the 
mistranslation of the word that means “bread-lines” as “bread riots” 
 
246 Id. at 629-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
247 Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
248 Id. at 486 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Richards, supra note 10, at 1321-22; 
Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civil Courage: The Brandeis Opinion 
in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 667 (1988).  
249 Chafee, Jr., supra note 237, at 935-36, 952, 966-67. 
250 Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 482 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
251 Id. at 482, 493 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“To prosecute men for such publications 
reminds of the days when men were hanged for constructive treason.  And, indeed, the jury 
may well have believed from the charge that the Espionage Act had in effect restored the 
crime of constructive treason.”). 
252 Id. at 486 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
253 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
254 Id. at 486-87 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
255 Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 487 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
256 Id. at 488 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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provide evidence of willfully misleading readers to hinder the United 
States’ success in the war.257  Brandeis wrote: 
To hold that such publications can be suppressed as 
false reports, subjects to new perils the constitutional 
liberty of the press, already seriously curtailed in 
practice under powers assumed to have been conferred 
upon the postal authorities.  Nor will this grave danger 
end with the passing of the war.  The constitutional 
right of free speech has been declared to be the same 
in peace and in war.  In peace, too, men may differ 
widely as to what loyalty to our country demands; and 
an intolerant majority, swayed by passion or by fear, 
may be prone in the future, as it has often been in the 
past to stamp as disloyal opinions with which it 
disagrees.  Convictions such as these, besides 
abridging freedom of speech, threaten freedom of 
thought and of belief.258 
He warned that holding harmless additions or omissions from articles 
and expressions of opinion in newspapers eligible for prosecution 
“will doubtless discourage criticism of the policies of the 
government.”259  In other words, punishing such expression that does 
not constitute a clear and present danger might undermine important 
duties of publicity by hindering individuals’ willingness to think 
about and discuss the government in critical terms as well as 
individuals’ ability to access such information via the press. 
One week later, Brandeis delivered a dissenting opinion in 
Pierce v. United States,260 a case involving the distribution of a four-
page leaflet published by the Socialist party.261  Brandeis objected to 
charging the defendants under the Espionage Act for attempting to 
cause insubordination and for making false reports and statements 
with the intent to interfere with the success of the armed forces.262  
Brandeis stated that the government did not provide evidence 
indicating that the defendants had the required intent to create a clear 
 
257 Id. at 492-93 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
258 Id. at 494-95 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
259 Id. at 493-94 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
260 252 U.S. 239 (1920). 
261 Id. at 253-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
262 Id. at 253-57 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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and present danger.263  His dissent stated that the test required 
evidence of intent to cause and likelihood of causing a clear and 
present danger.264  He also indicated that the allegedly false 
statements were statements of opinion that interpreted and discussed 
“public facts of public interest.”265  He stated that allowing such 
statements to be punished “would practically deny members of small 
political parties freedom of criticism and of discussion in times when 
feelings run high and questions involved are deemed fundamental.”266  
He wrote:  
      The fundamental right of free men to strive for 
better conditions through new legislation and new 
institutions will not be preserved, if efforts to secure it 
by argument to fellow citizens may be construed as 
criminal incitement to disobey the existing law—
merely because the argument presented seems to those 
exercising judicial power to be unfair in its portrayal 
of existing evils, mistaken in its assumptions, unsound 
in reasoning or intemperate in language.267 
That rationale may be compared to his prior assertion in True 
Americanism that all individuals needed equal opportunities to 
develop for their own good and the common good in an ideal 
American democracy.268 
Philippa Strum wrote that Brandeis’ “clerk David Riesman 
said that Brandeis had ‘an extraordinary faith in the possibilities of 
human development.’ ”269  That faith in individuals is apparent in 
Brandeis’ dissenting opinion in Gilbert v. Minnesota.270  That dissent, 
released nearly nine months after Brandeis’ dissenting opinion in 
Pierce, involved a state statute that made it unlawful to hinder 
enlistment in the armed forces as an overreaching statute that 
deprived individual liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
 
263 Id. at 271-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is not conceivable that any man of ordinary 
intelligence and normal judgment would be induced by anything in the leaflet to commit 
them and thereby risk the severe punishment prescribed for such offenses.  Certainly there 
was no clear and present danger that such would be the result.”). 
264 Id. at 272-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
265 Pierce, 252 U.S. at 269 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
266 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
267 Id. at 273 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
268 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 31. 
269 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS & PHILIPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS ON DEMOCRACY 210 (1995). 
270 254 U.S. 325, 334-43 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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Amendment.271  Since the statute also punished the teaching of 
pacifism in any context, Brandeis argued that the statute invaded the 
privacy and freedom of the home because it made it unlawful for 
individuals to follow their religious beliefs related to pacifism and it 
also made it unlawful for parents to teach their children about 
pacifism.272  Brandeis also described the statute’s limitations on 
speech as an abridgement of individuals’ duty to discuss government 
conduct.273  He wrote: 
The right of a citizen of the United States to take part, 
for his own or the country’s benefit, in the making of 
federal laws and in the conduct of the government, 
necessarily includes the right to speak or write about 
them; to endeavor to make his own opinion 
concerning laws existing or contemplated prevail; and, 
to this end, to teach the truth as he sees it.  Were this 
not so, ‘the right of the people to assemble for the 
purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of 
grievance or for anything else connected with the 
powers or duties of the national government’ would be 
a right totally without substance.  Full and free 
exercise of this right by the citizen is ordinarily also 
his duty; for its exercise is more important to the 
nation than it is to himself.  Like the course of the 
heavenly bodies, harmony in national life is a resultant 
of the struggle between contending forces.  In frank 
expression of conflicting opinion lies the greatest 
promise of wisdom in governmental action; and in 
suppression lies ordinarily the greatest peril.  There 
are times when those charged with the responsibility 
of government, faced with clear and present danger, 
may conclude that suppression of divergent opinion is 
imperative; because the emergency does not permit 
reliance upon the lower conquest of error by truth.  
And in such emergencies the power to suppress exists.  
 
271 Id. at 334-40 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The Minnesota statute was, when enacted, 
inconsistent with the law of the United States, because at that time Congress still permitted 
free discussion of these governmental functions.”). 
272 Id. at 335-36 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
273 Id. at 337-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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But the responsibility for the maintenance of the army 
and navy, for the conduct of war and for the 
preservation of government, both state and federal, 
from “malice domestic and foreign levy,” rests upon 
Congress.274 
Brandeis stated that the Minnesota statute was not valid because it 
interfered with functions reserved for the federal government “and 
with the right of a citizen of the United States to discuss them.”275  
His reasoning limited the ability of the government to suppress 
expression and teaching to emergencies when the suppression was 
essential to protect public safety.276  Brandeis’ subsequent dissenting 
opinion in Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering,277 however, indicated that 
individuals’ rights to pursue self-interests are secondary to their duty 
to the well being of society.278  
In 1925, Brandeis joined Holmes’ dissenting opinion in 
Gitlow v. New York.279  Holmes agreed with the majority’s assertion 
“that freedom of speech and of the press . . . are  . . . fundamental 
personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”280  The 
dissenting opinion, nonetheless, indicated that the majority opinion 
had not correctly applied the clear and present danger test to assess 
whether New York’s law unconstitutionally punished Benjamin 
Gitlow for publishing The Left Wing Manifesto.281  Holmes wrote: 
If what I think the correct test is applied it is manifest 
that there was no present danger of an attempt to 
overthrow the government by force on the part of the 
admittedly small minority who shared the defendant’s 
 
274 Id. at 337-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
275 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
276 Id. at 338-39 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
277 254 U.S. 443 (1921).  
278 Id. at 488 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating “All rights are derived from the purposes of 
the society in which they exist; above all rights rises duty to community.  The conditions 
developed in industry may be such that those engaged in it cannot continue their struggle 
without danger to the community.  But it is not for judges to determine whether such 
conditions exist, nor is it their function to set the limits of permissible contest and to declare 
the duties which the new situation demands.  This is the function of the legislature which, 
while limiting individual and group rights of aggression and defense, may substitute 
processes of justice for the more primitive method of trial by combat.”). 
279 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
280 Id. at 666.  
281 Id. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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views.  It is said that this manifesto was more than a 
theory, that it was an incitement.  Every idea is an 
incitement.  It offers itself for belief and if believed it 
is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or 
some failure of energy stifles the movement at its 
birth.  The only difference between the expression of 
an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is 
the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result.  Eloquence 
may set fire to reason.  But whatever may be thought 
of the redundant discourse before us it had no chance 
of starting a present conflagration.282  
Homes reasoned that freedom of speech meant that people should be 
able to express ideas.283 
Two years later, in a concurring opinion in Whitney v. 
California, Brandeis further clarified that the government could only 
be justified restricting incitements to violence that were intended to 
and actually likely to cause harm.284  Professor Vincent Blasi noted 
that Brandeis’ tone and emphasis changed in that concurrence.285  In 
Whitney, the Court found that the California Criminal Syndicalism 
Act was not unconstitutionally applied to punish activist Charlotte 
Anita Whitney for her involvement in helping organize the 
Communist Labor Party of California in 1919.286  Brandeis stated that 
he supported the majority ruling because testimony indicated that the 
party was engaged in some advocacy that could be considered a clear 
and present danger.287  He also wrote that freedom of speech and 
freedom of assembly are fundamental rights that government may 
restrain if necessary “to protect the State from destruction or from 
serious injury, political, economic, or moral.”288  Brandeis then 
clarified what would be necessary for the state to prove such 
restraints are necessary.289  He wrote: 
[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear 
and present, unless the incidence of the evil 
 
282 Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
283 Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
284 274 U.S. 357, 374-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
285 Blasi, supra note 248, at 666. 
286 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372. 
287 Id. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
288 Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
289 Id. at 374, 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before 
there is opportunity for full discussion.  If there be 
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and 
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of 
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, 
not enforced silence.  Only an emergency can justify 
repression.  Such must be the rule if authority is to be 
reconciled with freedom.  Such, in my opinion, is the 
command of the Constitution.  It is therefore always 
open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free 
speech and assembly by showing that there was no 
emergency justifying it.290 
He added that the “evil apprehended” must cause a serious injury and 
not merely prevent “a relatively trivial harm to society.”291  Brandeis’ 
concurrence has provided the foundation for the Court’s modern 
conception of freedom of expression.292 
Brandeis clarified that the Nation’s founders perceived 
freedom of speech and assembly to serve the essential role of 
protecting against tyranny from governing majorities.  He stated that 
government limitations should not prevent freedom of speech and 
assembly from serving essential roles in American society.293  He 
wrote: 
      Those who won our independence believed that 
the final end of the state was to make men free to 
develop their faculties, and that in its government the 
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.  
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.  
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and 
courage to be the secret of liberty.  They believed that 
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think 
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth; that without free speech and assembly 
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion 
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the 
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest 
 
290 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
291 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
292 Id. at 373, 375-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
293 Id. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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menace to freedom is an inert people; that public 
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a 
fundamental principle of the American government.294  
Thus, his words advocated for the importance of providing 
individuals with freedom to assemble and engage in political 
discussion.295  He presented freedom to discuss public matters as a 
right and a duty of American citizens in order to contribute to the 
well being of their democratic state.296  He also presented good 
speech as the remedy for bad speech.297 
In 1928, Brandeis again addressed, in his Olmstead dissent, 
the founders’ motivation to amend the Constitution in order to protect 
liberties fundamental to the pursuit of happiness.298  Although that 
ruling addressed privacy rights under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments rather than First Amendment freedoms of expression 
and assembly, the facts of the case involved the defendants’ rights to 
engage in telephone conversations without having government agents 
record the conversations and use the recordings as evidence of 
criminal activity.299  Brandeis’ dissenting opinion presented the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments as a way to protect individuals against 
means the government could use to force self-incrimination.300  He 
noted that the Founders “sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, 
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations,” recognizing “the 
right to be let alone.”301  Thus, the defendants’ constitutional right to 
privacy was violated when government actors revoked the 
defendants’ freedom to choose whether to share their thoughts, 
beliefs, and descriptions of their activities with government actors.302  
 
294 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
295 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
296 Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
297 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating “the fitting remedy for evil counsels is 
good ones”). 
298 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
299 Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
300 Id. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
301 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
302 See id. at 477-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  Brandeis also criticized the agents’ actions 
that intruded upon the privacy of the defendants and that violated a state law forbidding wire 
tapping for failing to follow laws that citizens must follow. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).  He wrote:  
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials 
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the 
citizen.  In a government of laws, existence of the government will be 
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Brandeis was concerned about the wrongdoing of the law 
enforcement officers who intruded upon the rights of individuals and 
whose unwarranted intrusions violated state law and the 
Constitution.303 
Three years later, Brandeis joined the majority opinion in 
Near v. Minnesota304 that also dealt with government actions that 
intruded upon fundamental liberties—freedom of speech and of the 
press.305  The majority deemed a Minnesota statute unconstitutional, 
which allowed newspapers to be enjoined for writing articles that 
harmed the reputation of government officials, regardless of whether 
the statements were true.306  Although Brandeis did not write an 
opinion, he made statements during oral arguments that may shed 
light on his separation of tortious wrongs to individuals and society 
from exposés that help society by revealing individuals’ 
wrongdoing.307  In 1931, Brandeis criticized the Minnesota gag law 
statute for restricting free expression necessary in a democratic 
community.308  When the U.S. Supreme Court considered Near, the 
New York Times quoted Brandeis as challenging a Minnesota gag law 
because it limited a privilege that seemed critical to having a “free 
press and the protection it affords in the democratic community.”309  
Brandeis stated that the editors sought to expose the alleged 
involvement in criminal activity of “criminals and public officials.”310  
“You are dealing here not with a sort of a scandal too often appearing 
in the press, and which ought not to appear to the interest of anyone, 
but with a matter of prime interest to every American citizen,” he 
stated, “They went forward with a definite program and certainly 
 
imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.  Our government is 
the potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the 
whole people by its example.  Crime is contagious.  If the government 
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man 
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.  To declare that in the 
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare 
that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the 
conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. 
Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
303 Id. at 472-73, 477-79, 482 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
304 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
305 Id. at 707. 
306 Id. at 722-23. 





Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 1, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/13
2017 SUNLIGHT AND SHADOWS  249 
they acted with great courage.  They invited suit for criminal libel if 
what they said was not true.”311  He then asked if the press does not 
exist to expose such potential wrongdoing by public officials, “for 
what does it exist?”312  Those statements reiterated the importance of 
free expression for citizens to learn about government activities and 
to be able to discuss such activities in a democratic society.313  
Although the ruling deals with libel rather than privacy, his comment 
about exposing other types of scandals relates to his previous writing 
about invasions of privacy that expose embarrassing information that 
is not related to a public or quasi-public interest.314  
In 1937, Brandeis addressed privacy and publicity in Senn v. 
Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5,315 a 5-4 ruling that did not 
support enjoining union members’ lawful picketing of a non-union 
business.316  Writing for the majority, Brandeis held a Wisconsin 
statute constitutional that permitted unions to use peaceful picketing 
and truthful publicity during a labor dispute.317  He indicated that the 
facts of this case were not comparable to a 1921 ruling that addressed 
picketing involving libelous and disparaging statements and 
threats.318  Rather, Senn addressed annoyances arising from the union 
members’ disclosing true information about Paul Senn, who owned 
and worked in a small tile contracting business that did not employ 
union-members.319  Brandeis stated that the annoyance suffered from 
such publicity “is not an invasion of the liberty guaranteed by the 
Constitution.”320  In a footnote, Brandeis acknowledged that the state 
may protect “interests of personality, such as ‘the right of privacy.’ 
”321  Senn, however, dealt with property interests rather than 
personality interests.322  That ruling, thus, favored the right of 
publicity to disclose truthful information that addressed commercial 
 
311 Id. 
312 Brandeis Criticizes Minnesota Gag Law, supra note 307, at 6.  
313 Id. 
314 See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 195 n.7. 
315 301 U.S. 468 (1937). 
316 Id. at 472, 482-83. 
317 Id. at 472, 482-83. 
318 Id. at 479-80 (citing Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921)). 
319 Id. at 473, 482. 
320 Senn, 301 U.S. at 482. 
321 Id. at 482 n.5. 
322 Id. at 477. 
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interests rather than private matters that did not harm the type of 
privacy rights addressed in The Right to Privacy.323  
In summary, Brandeis’ writings acknowledged that freedom 
of speech; press; and assembly, much like publicity, could serve as 
important means to protect individuals’ liberties to foster the 
common good.  But excesses, or abuses, of those freedoms that 
undermined individual liberty by inciting imminent violence or 
invading personal privacy could not be justified when they caused 
serious harm to the well being of individuals or government in a 
democratic society. 
V.  BALANCING PRIVACY AND FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY  
Brandeis’ writings suggested that privacy and publicity might 
be two sides of a coin essential to an ideal democratic society.  He 
wrote in a letter to Alice Goldmark that he wanted to write a 
companion piece to The Right to Privacy on The Duty of Publicity.324  
Warren and Brandeis’ article suggested that legal protection for 
thoughts and sensations was necessary for self-development in a 
democratic society.325  Publicity and freedom of expression served 
specific duties in American democratic society.  Brandeis believed 
that public opinion and law interacted, and both could be made.326  
For Brandeis, the living law was dynamic, subject to change as public 
opinion changed.327 His writings, nonetheless, provided some 
guidance for balancing free expression and privacy rights, as he 
wrote that the exercise of one individual’s rights ended where such 
exercise would hinder the exercise of another individual’s rights.328 
 
323 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196, 198-200; see also, 
Richards, supra note 10, at 1334. 
324 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Feb. 26, 1891), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 100. 
325  Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 195-96. 
326 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 28, 1890), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 97 (“All law is a dead letter without public opinion behind it.  But law and public 
opinion interact—and they are both capable of being made.”). 
327 See, e.g., Brandeis, The Living Law, supra note 213, at 461, 464. 
328 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32.  Brandeis wrote,  
Each man may develop himself so far, but only so far, as his doing so 
will not interfere with the exercise of a like right by all others. Thus 
liberty came to mean the right to enjoy life, to acquire property, to 
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Warren and Brandeis likely could not have imagined how sex 
tapes now are recorded and, at times, that the moving pictures and 
sound recordings would be disclosed publicly without consent during 
the twenty-first century.  In The Right to Privacy, they addressed the 
distribution of a celebrity’s portrait without her approval in the 
nineteenth century, stating, “Of the desirability—indeed of the 
necessity—of some such protection, there can, it is believed, be no 
doubt.  The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious 
bounds of propriety and of decency.”329  They criticized newspapers 
for publishing “details of sexual relations” and gossip, “which [could] 
only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle” in the 
nineteenth century.330  They suggested that the widespread circulation 
of those sensitive details harmed individuals by disclosing 
embarrassing information.331  They also presented the circulation of 
such information as harmful to society because it “invert[s] the 
relative importance of things” and distracts individuals from matters 
more relevant to the well being of society.332  
The Right to Privacy also clarified nuanced categorizations of 
reasonable public information disclosures that were fundamental in a 
democracy and the types of unreasonable disclosures of private 
information that a state could punish for invading privacy.  Warren 
and Brandeis indicated that private matters that “should be repressed 
may be described as those which concern the private life, habits, acts, 
and relations of an individual” when those details “have no legitimate 
connection” to a person’s “fitness for a public office” or to a person’s 
fitness “for any public or quasi public position . . . which [a person] 
seeks or for which [a person] is suggested.”333  Matters also should be 
considered private when they “have no legitimate relation to or 
bearing upon any act done by him in a public or quasi public 
capacity.”334  On the other hand, subjecting information to publicity 
may be justified if the released information “is of public or general 
interest” or may serve as a means of protecting individuals against 
 
pursue happiness in such manner and to such extent only as the exercise 
of a like right by every other of our fellow citizens. 
Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32. 
329 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196. 
330 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196. 
331 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196. 
332 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196. 
333 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 216. 
334 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 216. 
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despotism, corruption, exploitation, or incompetence that could harm 
society or undermine individual liberty.335  Warren and Brandeis 
wrote: 
The design of the law must be to protect those persons 
with whose affairs the community has no legitimate 
concern, from being dragged into an undesirable and 
undesired publicity and to protect all persons, 
whatsoever; their position or station, from having 
matters which they may properly prefer to keep 
private, made public against their will.  It is the 
unwarranted invasion of privacy which is 
reprehended, and to be, so far as possible, 
prevented. . . . There are persons who may reasonably 
claim as a right, protection from the notoriety entailed 
by being made the victims of journalistic enterprise. 
There are others who, in varying degrees, have 
renounced the right to live their lives screened from 
public observation.336 
Thus, disclosing the intimate details of one’s sexual affairs that 
occurred in the seclusion of the private, domestic sphere could be 
considered an unreasonable invasion of privacy when the person has 
not previously made such information publicly available.337  Similar 
disclosures also could be considered unreasonable when such 
information did not shed light on the character of a person who either 
has assumed or was likely to serve as a public leader or to assume 
public responsibility in business or politics. 
The Right to Privacy could also be considered a publication 
serving the duty of publicity to foster an ideal democratic state.338  
Warren and Brandeis’ criticism of invasions of privacy by the Penny 
Press was similar in nature to Brandeis’ criticism of excesses and 
corruption in business and government, which Brandeis considered 
potentially harmful to individuals and the common good in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.339  In December 1890, 
 
335 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 214-15. 
336 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 214-15. 
337 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 214-15. 
338 See BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 
92. 
339 See, e.g., Brandeis, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14; see also BRANDEIS, CURSE 
OF BIGNESS, supra note 120. 
42
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 1, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/13
2017 SUNLIGHT AND SHADOWS  253 
Brandeis wrote to Alice Goldmark that he would send her the 
Harvard Law Review article “to show you how public opinion may 
be made.”340  Two months later, Brandeis sent her a letter indicating 
his desire to write “ ‘The Duty of Publicity’—a sort of companion 
piece to the last one that would really interest me more.”341  That 
letter addressed people hiding wickedness and “shielding 
wrongdoers,” and presented “the broad light of day” as a remedy that 
“would purify them as the sun disinfects.”342  For Brandeis, publicity 
was a means to shape public opinion343 in a society that he saw as 
“fatally threatened by the ‘excesses’ of capitalism” and by 
injustice.344  He wrote articles, speeches, letters, and court opinions 
that addressed overreaching and excesses.345  Brandeis presented 
secrecy as a potential veil for such wrongdoing, a veil that ought to 
be pierced by the sunlight of publicity.346  
Later, in his service as a member of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Brandeis focused on the facts of cases that came before the Court.  
His early rulings that addressed freedom of expression were shaped 
by the context of World War I and a call for unanimity.347  Some of 
his subsequent dissenting opinions reflect concerns about government 
actors reaching beyond the roles assigned to them by law.  For 
instance, his dissenting opinion in Gilbert criticized Minnesota for 
passing a statute that limited freedom of speech by prohibiting the 
teaching or advocacy of pacifism.348  He called the law inconsistent 
with the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, and he indicated 
that the State did not have the authority to pass a law related to the 
U.S. army and navy, as Congress had that exclusive authority.349  
 
340 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 28, 1890), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 97. 
341 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Feb. 26, 1891), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 100. 
342 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Feb. 26, 1891), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 100. 
343 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 28, 1890), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 97. 
344 MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE, supra note 34, at 104.  
345 See, e.g., BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14; see also BRANDEIS, 
CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 120; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472, 485. 
346 See, e.g., BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 
14, at 92. 
347 UROFSKY, A LIFE, supra note 219, at 545-48. 
348 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 336 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
349 Id. at 335-36 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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Brandeis subsequently addressed excesses by government actors in 
his Olmstead dissent when he criticized federal prohibition agents for 
violating a state law that made recording telephone conversations 
unlawful.350  Brandeis suggested that the agents’ actions threatened 
the system of American government by applying different standards 
to citizens and government employees.351  Brandeis wrote, “Our 
government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good or for 
ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.”352  He suggested that 
by ignoring wiretapping laws the agents’ unreasonable actions 
suggested that others also might ignore the laws intended to protect 
individuals against intrusions upon their private conversations.353  He 
voiced concern that the unwarranted electronic intrusions could 
record “the most intimate occurrences of the home.”354  Both of these 
opinions addressed the potential for government actions to restrain 
the exercise of individual privacy rights, specifically, as hindering 
individual rights to develop thoughts and beliefs without unwarranted 
interference by government.355  In those contexts, the right to privacy 
contributed to personal development for an individual and to an 
individual’s ultimate ability to contribute to the common good of 
society.356 
In addition to Brandeis’ Olmstead and Gilbert opinions that 
focused on freedom for individual rights to develop their thoughts 
and beliefs via expression without unwarranted intrusions from 
government,357 Brandeis also made a reference to privacy in a 
footnote in Senn.358  Whereas the other two rulings addressed 
constitutional rights to privacy, that footnote indicated that states had 
authority to address harms to personality rights as invasions of 
 
350 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 480, 482-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
351 Id. at 480, 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
352 Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
353 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its 
example.  Crime is contagious.  If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt 
for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.”). 
354 Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
355 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474-75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 335-36, 
343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
356 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474-75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 335-36 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
357 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 337-38 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).   
358 Senn, 301 U.S. at 472 n.5. 
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privacy.359  The footnote differentiated those serious harms to 
personality from the annoyances that harmed a business owner’s 
property rights in the commercial realm.360  On one level, those 
rulings echoed Brandeis’ earlier concerns about privacy rights in the 
domestic realm, suggesting that Brandeis was concerned about 
disclosures of personal information that could thwart self-
development and individuals’ capabilities to participate in democratic 
society. 
For Brandeis, privacy, publicity, and freedom of expression 
for individuals and the press each contributed to individuals’ self-
development and participation in a democratic society.  His 
dissenting opinion in Pierce addressed the distribution of a circular 
that included opinions and discussions of “public facts of public 
interest.”361  He argued that allowing such publications to be 
punished would hinder individuals’ willingness and abilities to 
criticize and discuss government and harm “[t]he fundamental right 
of free men to strive for better conditions.”362  His concurring opinion 
in Whitney more emphatically defended the role that freedom of 
speech and press serve in a democratic society.363  He wrote, “public 
discussion is a political duty” and “this should be a fundamental 
principle of the American government.”364  He proposed that more 
speech—not criminal punishment—was the remedy that ought to be 
applied to bad speech in the context of seeking political truth.365  In 
Pierce and Whitney, however, Brandeis focused on speech about 
public matters that could be harmful to public perception of 
government—not on disclosures of sensitive personal information 
about private individuals.366  When Brandeis focused on freedom of 
expression as a means for individuals to learn about wrongdoing and 
to discuss reforms, speech and press served important roles to help 
form public opinion in a democratic society.  
 
359 Id.  
360 Id.  
361 Pierce, 252 U.S. at 269 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
362 Id. at 273 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
363 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373, 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
364 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
365 Id. at 375, 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating “the fitting remedy for evil counsels 
is good ones”). 
366 Id. at 373, 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Pierce, 252 U.S. at 264-67, 272-73 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
45
Coyle: Sunlight and Shadows
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
256 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
Warren and Brandeis similarly used the Harvard Law Review 
as a vehicle for their expression to seek reform on matters that 
harmed individuals and democratic society when they criticized the 
Penny Press’ abuses of its power by publishing sensational gossip 
and trivial matters that “both belittles and perverts.”367  Brandeis 
wrote that the most he and Warren could hope for the essay was “to 
start a backfire, as the woodsmen or the prairie men do.”368  Rather, 
they have been credited with inspiring a new area of law,369 an area 
that requires judges to engage in nuanced determinations of what 
types of invasions of privacy are sufficiently harmful to merit 
punishing the publications and potentially chilling future speech or 
publications.370  Brandeis indicated that government could limit 
individuals’ exercises of those rights when the exercises caused 
serious harm to another person, limiting that person’s right to enjoy 
life, acquire property, or pursue happiness.371  Brandeis’ dissenting 
opinion in Duplex Printing Co., however, stated that individuals’ 
duties to the well being of society outweigh individuals’ self-
interests.372 
 
367 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196. 
368 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 28, 1890), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 15, at 97. 
369 See, e.g., Gavison, supra note 10, at 438; Prosser, supra note 10, at 383-84; Richards, 
supra note 10, at 1295-96; Richards & Solove, supra note 10, at 125. 
370 Richards, supra note 10, at 1296-97. 
371 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32.  Brandeis wrote,  
[Each] man may develop himself so far, but only so far, as his doing so 
will not interfere with the exercise of a like right by all others.  Thus 
liberty came to mean the right to enjoy life, to acquire property, to 
pursue happiness in such manner and to such extent only as the exercise 
of the right in each is consistent with the exercise of a like right by every 
other of our fellow citizens.  Liberty thus defined underlies twentieth 
century democracy. 
Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32. 
372 Duplex Printing Co., 254 U.S. at 488 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“All rights are derived 
from the purposes of the society in which they exist; above all rights rises duty to 
community.  The conditions developed in industry may be such that those engaged in it 
cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community.  But it is not for judges to 
determine whether such conditions exist, nor is it their function to set the limits of 
permissible contest and to declare the duties which the new situation demands.  This is the 
function of the legislature which, while limiting individual and group rights of aggression 
and defense, may substitute processes of justice for the more primitive method of trial by 
combat.”). 
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Brandeis recognized the press was a valuable tool for 
informing citizens and inspiring reform in a democracy.373  The Right 
to Privacy was an attempt to deter wrongdoing by newspapers 
publishing gossip and personal information by rallying public 
opinion—not an attempt to shut down the Penny Press newspapers.  
In his dissenting opinion in Schaefer, Brandeis presented a 
newspaper’s presentation of opinion and discussion of public matters 
as essential for democracy.374  He argued that punishing newspaper 
employees for publishing minor errors when reporting material that 
could not hinder the nation’s military efforts would “discourage 
criticism of the policies of the government,” abridge freedom of 
speech, and “threaten freedom of thought and belief.”375  Brandeis 
also criticized the Minnesota statute applied to punish a newspaper 
publisher for reporting on potential wrongdoing by government 
employees when he considered Near.376  Brandeis’ commentary 
quoted in the New York Times suggested Brandeis was distinguishing 
between types of material that promoted democracy and thus ought to 
be published in the press and other stories of scandal that “ought not 
to appear to the interest of anyone.”377  Brandeis recognized a role of 
the press to expose wrongdoing related to public matters, but not a 
role for the press to expose personal details related to home life in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 378 
Brandeis’ writings suggest that he might have supported 
judgments that punish gossip-publishers for publishing intimate 
details from private life, such as sexual affairs, when those details 
failed to shed valuable light on a person’s wrongdoing or potential 
for wrongdoing in a public position.379  As a jurist, Brandeis 
recognized an important role that speech and press play, informing 
people and addressing wrongdoing by societal leaders.  He also 
supported providing individuals with information that would help 
 
373 See, e.g., Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Edwin Munroe Bacon (Aug. 6, 1890), 
paraphrased in 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 90; Brandeis Criticizes Minnesota Gag Law, 
supra note 307, at 6. 
374 Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 494-95 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
375 Id. at 494-95 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
376 Near, 283 U.S. at 697. 
377 Id. at 713, 715; Brandeis Criticizes Minnesota Gag Law, supra note 307, at 6. 
378 See Near, 283 U.S. at 697; see also Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra 
note 12, at 196, 214-16. 
379 See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196, 214-16. 
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them participate in an ideal democratic society.380  His writings 
suggest judges could draw a line between privacy rights and free 
expression rights at the point that disclosures would cause serious 
harm to individuals that hinders their personal development and 




380 Richards, supra note 10, at 1350. 
381 See, e.g., Duplex Printing Co., 254 U.S. at 486, 488 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 
Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32; Warren & Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, supra note 12, at 215. 
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